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Over  the  last  decade  numerous  types  of  short-term 
investment  pooling  arrangements  (STIPs)  have 
emerged  in  the  nation’s  financial  system.  The  most 
well-known  and  widely  publicized  form  of  STIP  is 
the  money  market  mutual  fund  (MMF).  However, 
MMFs  are  only  one  of  at  least  eight  types  of  STIPs 
that  were  operating  in  the  United  States  at  the  end 
of  1979.  While  the  various  types  of  STIPs  differ  in 
some  respects,  such  as  the  kind  of  asset  held  or  the 
type  of  investor,  they  are  all  alike  in  their  basic  func- 
tion,  which  is  to  purchase  large  pools  of  short-term 
financial  instruments  and  sell  shares  in  these  pools 
to  investors.  In  almost  all  instances  discussed  in  this 
article,  the, pool  allows  participants  to  invest  a  much 
smaller  amount  of  money  than  would  be  necessary  to 
directly  purchase  the  individual  securities  held  by  the 
pool. 
This  paper  examines  the  STIP  phenomenon. 
Section  I  describes  the  various  forms  of  STIPs  and 
provides  estimates  of  ( 1)  the  growth  and  total  assets 
of  STIPs  and  (2)  the  proportion  of  various  money 
market  instruments  held  by  STIPs  at  the  end  of  1979. 
Section  II  deals  with  the  question  of  why  this  type 
of  financial  intermediary  proliferated  and  thrived  in 
the  1970’s.  Some  implications  of  STIPs  for  the  fi- 
nancial  markets  are  explored  in  Section  III. 
I. 
SHORT-TERM  INVESTMENT  POOLS 
Characteristics  of  different  STIPs  are  summarized 
in  Table  I.  While  all  STIPs  basically  function  as 
intermediaries  for  short-term  securities,  they  can 
differ  in  several  ways.  First,  some  STIPs  are  open 
to  a wide  variety  of  investors  while  others  cater  only 
to  a  narrow  group.  Second,  some  STIPs  hold  many 
different money  market  instruments  while  others  con- 
fine  their  investment  to  one  type  of  security.  Third, 
some  STIPs  are  “open-end”  arrangements  that  allow 
investors  to  purchase  and  redeem  shares  of  an  ever- 
changing  pool  of  underlying  securities.  In  other 
STIPs  investors  buy  shares  of  a  specific  pool  of 
securities.  Other  features  that  vary  among  STIPs 
include  minimum  investment  size,  expense  ratios, 
and’  methods  of  investing  and  withdrawing  funds. 
Money  Market  Mutual  Funds  Because  MMFs 
were  discussed  in  great  detail  in  two  earlier  articles 
in  this  Review  [4,  5],  the  discussion  here  will  be 
brief.  The  general  operating  characteristics  of  MMFs 
are  fairly  standard.  Minimum  initial  investments 
usually  range  from  $500  to  $5,000,  although  a very 
small  number  of  funds  require  no  minimum  and 
others,  designed  for  institutional  investors,  require 
minimums  of  $50,000  or  more.  With  the  exception 
of the  small  number  of funds  that  limit  their  investors 
to  institutions,  MMF  shares  are  available  to  any  type 
of  investor.  Most  funds  have  a  checking  option  that 
enables  shareholders  to  write  checks  of  $500  or  more. 
Shares  can  also  be  redeemed  at  most  MMFs  by  tele- 
phone  or  wire  request,  in  which  case  payment  by  the 
MMF  is  either  mailed  to  the  investor  or  remitted  by 
wire  to  the  investor’s  bank  account. 
MMFs  are  open-end  investment  companies  that 
vary  considerably  in  both  the  type  and  average  ma- 
turity  of  securities  they  hold.  A  large  percentage  of 
most  MMFs’  holdings  are  in  domestic  and  Euro- 
dollar  CDs,  commercial  paper  and  Treasury  bills,  but 
various  other  high  grade  money  market  instruments 
are  also  commonly  purchased.  A  small  number  of 
MMFs  have  restricted  their  investments  to  govern- 
ment  securities,  apparently  to  attract  more  risk- 
averse  investors,  and  an  equally  small  number  have 
invested  very  heavily  in  Eurodollar  CDs. 
Because  MMFs  are  generally  “no-load”  mutual 
funds,  investors  purchase  and  redeem  MMF  shares 
without  paying  a  sales  charge.  Instead,  expenses  of 
the  funds  are  deducted-daily  from  gross  income  be- 
fore  dividends  are  declared.  The  difference  between 
the  yield  earned  on  a  MMF’s  assets  and  the  yield 
earned  by  the  shareholders  is  the  MMF’s  expense 
ratio.  (Alternatively,  this  can  be  measured  as  the 
ratio  of  total  expenses  on  an  annual  basis  to  average 
assets.)  In  1978  the  expense  ratio  for  different 
MMFs  ranged  from  .4  percent  to  1.4  percent  [4]. 
The  weighted  average  expense  ratio  for  the  industry 
as  a  whole  was  .55  in  1979.1 
1 The  weighted  average  expense  ratio  for  MMFs  is  cal- 
culated  from  expense  data  for  55  MMFs,  with  fiscal 
years  ending  near  the  end  of  1979,  presented  in  Lipper- 
Directors’  Analytical  Data,  May  1980. 
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public  in  1972.  By  the  end  of  1974  there  were  15 
MMFs  and  by  the  end  of  1979,  76  were  in  operation. 
Total  MMF  assets  at  the  end  of  1979  were  $45.2 
billion.2 
Short-Term  Tax-Exempt  Funds  Short-term  tax- 
exempt  funds  (STEFs)  are  the  tax-exempt  counter- 
part  to  MMFs.  STEFs  invest  primarily  in  securities 
issued  by  state  and  local  governments  (“munici- 
pals”),  which  pay  interest  income  that  is  exempt 
from  Federal  income  taxes.  The  first  short-term  tax- 
exempt  fund  offered  shares  to  the  public  in  1977  and 
several  others  were  formed  in  1979.  By  mid-1980 
there  were  at  least  10  STEFs  operating  with  com- 
bined  assets  of  over  one-and-a-half-billion  dollars. 
As  a result  of  the  type  of  financial  assets  they  pur- 
chase,  STEFs  appeal  to  investors  in  high  Federal 
income  tax  brackets.  More  specifically,  an  investor 
facing  the  choice  between  two  investments  that  are 
alike  in  every  respect  except  that  one  offers  a  yield 
that  is  subject  to  Federal  income  taxes,  YT,  while 
the  other’s  yield  is  tax-free,  YTF,  will  choose  the 
alternative  that  offers  the  highest  after-tax  return. 
That  is,  the  investor  will  choose  the  tax-free  invest- 
ment  option  if  YTF  >  YT(l-t),  where  t  is  the  in- 
vestor’s  marginal  Federal  income  tax  rate.  Thus, 
by  examining  the  ratio  of  short-term  tax-exempt 
yields  to  short-term  taxable  yields  it  is  possible  to 
determine  at  what  minimum  marginal  tax  rate  an 
investor  would  be  better  off  investing  in  a  STEF 
than  in  a  MMF.  While  this  ratio  varies  considerably 
over  time,  available  evidence  suggests  that  an  in- 
vestor  probably  has  to  have  a  marginal  Federal  tax 
rate  of  more  than  50  percent  to  achieve  a  higher 
after-tax  yield  in  a  STEF  than  in  a  MMF.3 
While  after-tax  yield  comparisons  might  indicate 
that  an  investor  with  a  very  high  marginal  tax  rate 
2 Much  of  the  data  used  in  this  article  is  available  only 
on  a year-end  basis.  Consequently,  for  purposes  of  com- 
parison  and  for  uniformity,  year-end  1979  data  are  used 
throughout  the  article  for  all  STIPs.  In  the  six-month 
period  following  the  end  of  1979,  MMF  assets  grew  to  a 
level  of  $76.7  billion. 
3 The  ratio  of  short-term  tax-exempt  to  short-term  tax- 
able  yields  varied  from  .421  to  .492  in  1979  [8].  This 
implies  that  a  marginal  tax  rate  of  somewhere  between 
50.8 percent  and  57.9  percent  would  have  been  necessary 
to  make  an  investor  indifferent  between  the  choice  of 
taxable  and  tax-exempt  instruments  if  no  costs  were 
associated  with  investment.  If  both  the  MMF  and  the 
STEF  had  the  same  expense  ratio,  ER,  the  true  marginal 
tax  rate  which  leaves  the  investor  indifferent  is 
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which  implies  that  an  even  higher  marginal  tax  bracket  is 
necessary  to  make  the  STEF  the  preferable  alternative. 
would  be  better  off  in  a  STEF  than  in  a  MMF,  one 
major  qualification  must  be  added.  Largely  because 
of  the  small  quantity  of  very  short-term  municipal 
securities  available  for  purchase,  STEF  portfolios 
have  generally  been  of  longer  average  maturity  than 
MMF  portfolios.  To  the  extent  that  STEF  port- 
folios  have  longer  maturities  than  MMF  portfolios, 
the  variation  in  the  STEF’s  share  price  and  in  the 
STEF  investor’s  principal  will  be  somewhat  greater 
than  for  MMF  shares.  For  some  investors  this  may 
lessen  the  relative  attractiveness  of  STEFs. 
In  order  to  minimize  the  perceived  problem  of  a 
varying  share  price,  most  STEFs  have  opted,  like 
most  MMFs,  to  maintain  an  average  maturity  of  120 
days  or  less  in  order  to  gain  exemptive  orders  from 
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  permitting 
the  use  of  accounting  policies  that  should  enable  the 
maintenance  of  a  constant  net  asset  value.4 
As  a  means  of  achieving  shorter  average  maturi- 
ties,  some  STEFs  have  retained  the  right  to  use  a 
“put  option”  technique.  Under  this  arrangement, 
the  fund  would  purchase  municipal  securities,  often 
at  a  higher  price  (lower  yield)  than  it  would  nor- 
mally  pay  for  these  securities,  at  the  same  time  ac- 
quiring  the  right  or  option  to  sell  the  securities  back 
to  the  seller  at  an  agreed-upon  price  on  a  certain 
date  or  within  a  specified  period  in  the  future.  The 
primary  advantage  of  this  technique  is  that  it  may 
allow  the  fund  to  tailor  a  shorter  term  portfolio. 
The  major  disadvantage  is  that  the  fund  is  dependent 
on  the  ability  and  willingness  of  the  seller  to  buy 
back  the  securities.  Furthermore,.  there  are  also 
thorny  legal  issues  yet  to  be  resolved,  such  as  the 
appropriate  method  of  valuing  securities  purchased 
under  put  options  and  the  tax  status  of  securities 
purchased  under  put  options. 
Unlike  the  yield  curve  for  taxable  securities,  the 
yield  curve  for  municipals  is  almost  always  upward- 
sloping  throughout  the  entire  range  of  maturities, 
i.e.,  a  higher  yield  is  paid  for  securities  of  longer 
maturity.  Consequently,  the  tradeoff  encountered  in 
trying  to  maintain  a  very  short  average  maturity  in  a 
municipal  portfolio  is  generally  a  lower  yield  on  the 
portfolio.  For  this  reason  some  STEFs  retain  the 
option  of  holding  an  average  maturity  of  one  year  or 
over. 
Short-Term  Investment  Funds  Short-term  in- 
vestment  funds  (STIFs)  are  collective  investment 
4 These  funds  obtain  a  stable  share  value  by  using  amor- 
tized  cost  or  “penny-rounding”  methods  of  share  price 
determination.  These  concepts  are  described  in  Cook 
and  Duffield  [5]. 
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CHARACTERISTICS  OF  SHORT-TERM  INVESTMENT  POOLS 
Year  First  Type  of 
One  started  Investors 
Minimum 
Investment  Assets 
Maturity 
End  of  1979 





Expense  Ratio 
(basis  points) 
Money  Market  Funds  1972  anyone  $1,000  to  $5,000  is 
most  common;  some 
funds  for  institutions 
require  $50,000 
or  more 
wide  range  weighted 
average 
maturity-of 
34  days 





ratio  of  55 
Short-Term 
Tax-Exempt  Funds  1977  investors  desiring  varies  from  tax-exempt  120  to  150  days  open-end  wire,  similar  to  MMF 
income  free  of  $1,000  to  $25,000  securities  check-writing,  expense 
Federal  taxes  mail 
Short-Term 
Investment  Funds  1968(?)  accounts  of  bank  negligible  n.a.; 
trust  department 
wide  range;  open-end  daily  transfer  n.a. 
mostly  by  regulation  on  request 
commercial  paper  very  short 
Local  Government 
Investment  Pools  1973  state  and  local  usually  none  wide  range  varies  greatly  open-end  wire,  checks  in  n.a. 
government  (see  text)  some  cases 
bodies  (usually  24  hours 
notice  needed  for 
withdrawals  of 
greater  than 
$1  million) 
Credit  Union  Pools  1968  credit  unions  n.a.  mainly  Treasury  varies  open-end  wire,  draft  n.a. 
bills  and 
Federal  agencies 
Short-Term 
Investment  Trusts  1974  anyone  $1,000  primarily 
Eurodollar  CDs 
6  months  unit 
investment 
trust 
funds  returned  at 
maturity;  can  sell 
prior  to  maturity 
subject  to  a  charge 
140 




funds  returned  at  varies  inversely 
end  of  3-  or  6-month  with  maturity 
investment;  can  sell  and  with  size 
prior  to  maturity  of  investment; 
subject  to  a  charge  expense  ratio 
for  a  $5,000 
investment  in 
6-month  bill 
would  be  90 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND funds  operated  by  bank  trust  departments.  A  collec- 
tive  investment  fund  is  an  arrangement  whereby  the 
monies  of  different  accounts  in  the  trust  department 
are  pooled  to  purchase  a  certain  type  of  security, 
such  as  common  stocks,  corporate  bonds,  tax-exempt 
bonds,  or,  in  the  case  of  STIFs,  short-term  securi- 
ties.  The  first  STIF  was  started  no  later  than  1968.5 
By  the  end  of 1974  there  were  over  70  STIFs  with 
total  assets  of $2.7  billion.  STIF  assets  grew  rapidly 
in  1978  and  1979  and  by  the  end  of  1979  total  STIF 
assets  were  over  $32  billion. 
STIFs  function  just  like  MMFs  and  offer  the 
same  advantages  to the  accounts  of  the  trust  depart- 
ment.  In  particular,  the  minimum  investment  is 
usually  a  negligible  amount  and  funds  can  be  put  in 
and  withdrawn  without  transaction  fees. 
That  STIFs  and  MMFs  provide  virtually  the  same 
services  to  their  customers  is  illustrated  by  the  fact 
that  many  trust  departments  use  MMFs  rather  than 
establish  STIFs.  The  decision  to  set  up  a  STIF  or 
to  use  a  MMF  for  its  customers’  short-term  assets  is 
largely  dependent  on  the  size  of the  trust  department. 
The  larger  the  trust  department,  the  more  likely  it  is 
to  have  a  STIF.  Survey  data  from  1978  (presented 
in  [5])  revealed  that  of  the  trust  departments  with 
assets  of  $100  million  or  less,  fewer  than  1  percent 
had  established  STIFs  and  of  the  trust  departments 
with  assets  of  $100  million  to  $500  million,  only 
about  10 percent  had  STIFs.  In  contrast,  almost  40 
percent  of  the  trust  departments  in  the  survey  with 
assets  of  $500  million  to  $1  billion  had  STIFs  and 
about  65  percent  of  the  departments  with  assets  of  $1 
billion  or  more  had  STIFs.  Most  bank  trust  de- 
partments  without  STIFs  use  MMFs.6 
Both  the  type  and  maturity  of  assets  held  by 
STIFs  reflect  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency’s 
Regulations  on  the  portfolios  of  STIFs.  The  two 
key  regulations  are  that  : 
(1)  at  least  80  percent 
be  payable  on  demand  or 
exceeding  91  days,  and 
of  investments  must 
have  a  maturity  not 
5 This  is  the  earliest  date  for  which  the  authors  are  aware 
of  the  existence  of  a  STIF.  It  is  possible  that  other 
STIFs  were  formed  prior  to  1968. 
6 Cook  and  Duffield  [4]  argue  that  the  explanation  for 
the  use  of  MMFs  by  small-  and  medium-sized  bank  trust 
departments  is  that  both  MMFs  and  STIFs  are  subject 
to  decreasing  average  costs  as  assets  increase.  Conse- 
quently,  a  small-  or  medium-sized  bank  trust  department 
can  get  a  higher  yield  net  of  expenses  for  its  accounts  by 
investing  in  a  MMF  than  by  setting  up  a  relatively  small 
STIF.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  some  agency  ac- 
counts  of  bank  trust  departments  are  not  eligible  to  invest 
in  STIFs  but  may  invest  in  MMFs. 
(2)  not  less  than  40  percent  of  the  value  of 
the  fund  must  be  cash,  demand  obligations,  and 
assets  that  mature  on  the  fund’s  next  business 
day. 
As  a  result  of  these  regulations,  STIFs  hold  a  sub- 
stantial  amount  of  variable  amount  notes  (also  called 
master  notes),  which  are  a  type  of  open-ended  com- 
mercial  paper  that  allows  the  investment  and  with- 
drawal  of  funds  on  a  daily  basis  and  pays  a  daily 
interest  rate  tied  to  the  current  commercial  paper 
rate.  In  addition,  STIFs  hold  a  large  amount  of 
standard  commercial  paper  and  a  much  smaller 
amount  of  time  and  savings  deposits  and  Treasury 
securities.  A  very  small  number  of  STIFs  invest 
primarily  in  short-term  tax-exempt  securities. 
Typically,  only  the  audit  expenses  of  STIFs  are 
charged  directly  against  the  income  earned  by  the 
STIFs  and  it  is  only  this  expense  that  appears  in  the 
STIF  annual  report.  Other  expenses  are  covered 
by  fees  charged  to  the  accounts  of  the  trust  depart- 
ment.  Consequently,  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  the 
expense  ratio  of  STIFs  from  published  reports. 
Local  Government  Investment  Pools  Local  gov- 
ernment  investment  pools  (LGIPs)  were  in  oper- 
ation  in  11  states  by  the  end  of  1979.7  These  pools 
have  been  set  up  to  enable  local  government  entities 
(such  as  counties,  cities,  school  districts,  etc.,‘ and  in 
all  but  two  states,  state  agencies)  to  purchase  shares 
in  a  large  portfolio  of  money  market  instruments. 
The  primary  purpose  of  state  legislation  establishing 
the  pools  has  been  to  encourage  efficient  management 
of  idle  funds. 
Since  many  local  government  bodies  have  rela- 
tively  small  sums  of  money  to  invest,  they  would 
seem  to  benefit  most  from  LGIPs.  However,  in 
many  LGIPs  the  majority  of  assets  represent  state 
funds.  Surprisingly,  through  1979  only  a  small  per- 
centage  of  eligible  local  government  bodies  were 
investing  in  the  pools.  Duncan  [6]  reports  that  in 
July  1979  the  percentage  of  eligible  participants  con- 
tributing  to  LGIPs  ranged  from  less  than  1 percent 
in  Illinois  to  35  percent  in  Massachusetts. 
Except  for  the  LGIPs  of  Massachusetts  and  Illi- 
nois,  the  pools  are  administered  by  the  state  trea- 
surer’s  office,  often  in  conjunction  with  the  state 
investment  board  and  a  local  government  advisory 
council.  The  Illinois  pool  is  administered  by  a  bank 
7 These  states  are  California,  Connecticut,  Florida,  Illi- 
nois,  Massachusetts,  Montana,  New  Jersey,  Oregon, 
Utah,  West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.  In  addition,  legis- 
lation  was  recently  passed  in  Oklahoma  providing  for  the 
creation  of  a  LGIP. 
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run  by  an  investment  management  firm. 
In  most  respects,  the  operating  characteristics  of 
LGIPs  are  identical  to  those  of  MMFs.  Funds  may 
be  invested  by  wire  or  check  and  withdrawn  either  by 
telephone  request,  with  payment  sent  by  wire,  or  in 
some  cases  by  check.  Funds  may  generally  be  in- 
vested  and  withdrawn  on  a  daily  basis,  although 
several  LGIPs  require  24  hours’  notice  prior  to  the 
withdrawal  of  $1  million  or  more.  While  there  are 
usually  no  minimum  investment  or  withdrawal  con- 
straints,  small  transactions  are  often  informally  dis- 
couraged.  Interest  is  earned  daily,  except  in  one 
LGIP  which  distributes  income  quarterly. 
The  pools  invest  in  a  broad  range  of  securities 
many  of  which  would  not  be  legally  available  to  the 
participants  if  they  invested  their  funds  individually. 
That  is,  many  LGIP  participants  are  legally  pro- 
hibited  from  directly  investing  in  some  of  the  types 
of securities  which  the  pool  is  authorized  to  purchase. 
LGIPs  in  different  states  have  followed  widely 
differing  maturity  strategies.  Whereas  at  the  end 
of  December  1979,  the  longest  average  maturity  of 
any  MMF  was  less  than  three  months,  several  LGIP 
portfolios  had  average  maturities  in  the  1-to-3-year 
range.  Others.  maintained  average  maturities  as 
short  as  those  of  MMFs. 
Credit  Union  Pools  Two  short-term  pools  have 
been  established  for  the  investment  of  surplus  funds 
of  credit  unions.  The  government  securities  pool  of 
the  Credit  Union  National  Association  (CUNA),  a 
service  organization  representing  more  than  90  per- 
cent  of  the  22,000  credit  unions  in  the  U.  S.,  repre- 
sents  one  of  the  nation’s  earliest  short-term  pooling 
arrangements,  having  commenced  operations  in  1968. 
This  pool  had  over  $1  billion  in  assets  and  more  than 
10,000  participating  credit  unions  at  year-end  1979. 
The  other  pool  was  created  in  1976  by  the  National 
Association  of  Federal  Credit  Unions  (NAFCU). 
Both  pools  are  operated  as  common  trust  funds  by 
bank  trust  departments.  In  most  respects  they  are 
identical  to  other  open-end  STIPs.  Investments  and 
withdrawals  may  be  made  daily.  Participating  credit 
unions  may  request  withdrawals  by  telephone  with 
funds  remitted  by  wire  or  they  may  write  a  draft  on 
their  pool  account  and  deposit  it  at  their  commercial 
bank.  Drafts  may  not  be  used  for  third-party  pay- 
ment. 
CUNA’s  pool  invests  solely  in  U.  S.  Government 
and  Federal agency  securities.  The  average  maturity 
of  its  portfolio  was  seven-and-one-half-months  at  the 
end  of  1979.  The  NAFCU  pool  can  invest  in  any 
type  of  security  eligible  for  purchase  by  a  Federal 
credit  union.  Thus,  in  addition  to  U.  S.  Government 
securities,  the  pool  may  purchase  domestic  certificates 
of  deposit  but  is  prohibited  from  investing  in  Euro- 
dollar  CDs,  commercial  paper  and  bankers  accep- 
tances.  The  NAFCU  pool  has  maintained  a  very 
short  average  maturity,  30  days  at  the  end  of  1979. 
Short-Term  Investment  Trusts  Short-term  in- 
vestment  trusts  (STITs),  or  short-term  income 
trusts,  are  a type  of  unit  investment  trust  that  invests 
exclusively  in  short-term  financial  instruments. 
These  funds  are  put  together  by  groups  of  brokers 
that  sell  shares  in  units  of  $1,000  to  their  retail  cus- 
tomers.  Unlike  MMF  shares,  these  shares  represent  a 
claim  to  part  of  a  specific  set  of  securities.  Hence, 
when  these  securities  mature,  the  fund  is  terminated. 
The  first  eight  series  of  STITs  were  sold  in  1974, 
all  by  one  broker  group.  No  more  STITs  were  sold 
until  September  1978  when  the  same  broker  group 
again  began  to  offer  STITs.  A  second  broker  group 
began  to  market  STITs  in  January  1979.  From 
September  1978  through  the  end  of  1979, 47  separate 
series  of  STITs  totalling  $6.1  billion  were  sold  to 
the  public.  At  the  end  of  1979  there  were  35  series 
of  STITs  outstanding  with  total  assets  of $4.6  billion. 
The  maturity  of  all  but  two  of  the  STIT  series 
sold  through  1979  was  six  months.  The  assets  of 
the  STITs  put  together  by  the  first  broker  group 
have  been  composed  of  (1)  CDs  of  foreign  branches 
of  U.  S.  banks,  (2)  CDs  of  foreign  banks,  (3)  CDs 
of  U.  S.  branches  of  foreign  banks,  and  (4)  CDs  of 
domestic  banks.  Of  these,  the  first  two  categories, 
which  are  “Eurodollar  CDs,”  comprised  72.1  percent 
of  the  total  assets  of  the  STITs  offered  by  this group 
in  1979.  The  second  broker  group  has  generally 
included  in  their  STITs  only  CDs  of foreign  branches 
(specifically,  London  branches)  of  domestic  banks. 
On  an  annualized  basis  the  expense  ratios  of  the 
STIT  series  sold  in  1979  generally  ranged  from  140 
to  150  basis  points.8  (This  is  calculated  as  the  sales 
charge  plus  expenses  of  the  Fund  divided  by  the 
offering  price  and  annualized.)  This  calculation 
assumes  that  the  STIT  share  is  held  to  maturity. 
The  share  can  be  sold  prior  to  maturity  subject  to  an 
8 The  term  “expense  ratio”  is  used  broadly  here  to  en- 
compass  all  expenses,  including  sales  charges,  that  lower 
the  investor’s  net  yield.  There  are  two  possible  reasons 
why  the  STIT  expense  ratio  is  higher  than  the  MMF 
expense  ratio.  First,  the  labor  expenses  of  a  STIT  may 
be  greater  because  it  requires  a  large  network  of  dealers 
to  actively  market  the  STIT  shares.  Second,  the  size  of 
the  average  STIT,  is  much  smaller  than  the  size  of  the 
average  MMF,  so  that  MMFs  may  benefit  more  from 
economies  of  scale. 
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tive  expense  ratio  would  be  somewhat  higher. 
Other  Types  of  STIPs  In  addition  to  the  six 
types  of  STIPs  discussed  so  far,  there  are  a  small 
number  of  STIPs  for  which  data  were  not  collected 
for  this  article.  These  fall  into  two  categories. 
Shares-in-Bills  One  organization  of  brokers  and 
dealers  has  established  a  program  whereby  investors 
can  purchase  shares  in  specific  three-  and  six-month 
Treasury  bills.  From  the  investor’s  point  of  view, 
this  program  is  similar  to  a  unit  investment  trust  that 
invests  exclusively  in  bills.  The  minimum  purchase 
requirement  is  $1,000.  According  to  the  program’s 
advertising  literature,  it  has  been  in  operation  since 
1969.  However,  only  recently  has  the  program  been 
widely  advertised,  suggesting  that  it  was  relatively 
insignificant  prior  to  1979.9 
The  annualized  expense  ratio  of  a  bill  purchased 
through  the  program  is  inversely  related  to  the  size 
and  maturity  of  the  investment.  An  investment  of 
$5,000  in  a  three-month  bill  has  an  annualized  ex- 
pense  ratio  of  120  basis  points  while  a  $5,000  invest- 
ment  in  a  six-month  bill  has  an  expense  ratio  of  90 
basis  points. 
Other  Open-End  STIPs  Lastly,  at  least  one 
other  type  of  financial  intermediary-life  insurance 
companies-is  already  operating  open-end  STIPs 
and  a  second-savings  and  loan  associations-will 
probably  begin  to  do  so  in  the  early  1980’s.  Life 
insurance  companies  provide  investment  services  for 
various  types  of thrift  and  pension  plans.  In  the  past, 
insurance  companies  have  offered  these  plans  such 
alternatives  as  investing  in  commingled  bond  or  stock 
accounts.  Recently,  some  life  insurance  companies 
have  also  begun  to  offer  short-term  investment  com- 
mingled  accounts.10 
The  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and 
Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980  gives  federal  savings 
and  loan  associations  the  authority  to  provide  trust 
services.  As  noted  above,  most  small-  and  moderate- 
sized  bank  trust  departments  use  MMFs  while  large 
trust  departments  generally  set  up  their  own  STIFs. 
9 Interestingly,  unlike  a  STIT,  the  shares-in-bills  pro- 
gram  is  not  organized  as  an  investment  company.  Hence, 
no  prospectus  or  annual  report  is  published  and  no  infor- 
mation  on  the  size  of  the  program  is  readily  available. 
The  authors  were  unable  to  get  this  information  from  the 
sponsor. 
10 The  authors  became  aware  of  the  existence  of  life 
insurance  company  STIPs  late  in  the  preparation  of  this 
article.  Consequently,  no  attempt  was  made  to  gather 
data  for  this  type  of  STIP. 
The  savings  and  loan  associations  who  compete  in  the 
market  for  trust  services  will  have  these  same  op- 
tions.  It  is  probable  that  some  of  the  larger  associ- 
ations  will  establish  their  own  short-term  investment 
pooling  arrangements. 
STIP  Growth  and  Percentage  Holdings  of  Vari- 
ous  Money  Market  Instruments  The  growth  of 
assets  of  each  type  of  short-term  investment  pool  and 
the  growth  of  aggregate  STIP  assets  from  1974 
through  1979  is  shown  in  Table  II.  Total  STIP 
assets.  grew  rapidly  in  the  high  interest  rate  period 
of  1974.  Asset  growth  leveled  off  in  1976,  when 
interest  rates  reached  a  cyclical  trough,  and  acceler- 
ated  sharply  from  1977  through  1979,  a  period  of 
rising  interest  rates.  Almost  all  types  of  STIPs 
participated  in  this  rapid  growth.  Assets  of  the  six 
types  of  STIPs  for  which  data  were  available  totaled 
$88.5  billion  at  the  end  of  1979.  MMFs  held  slightly 
over  half  of  this  total. 
Table  III  shows  the  composition  of  STIP  assets 
by  type  of  STIP  and  calculates  the  percentage  of 
various  types  of  money  market  instruments  held  by 
STIPs  at  the  end  of  1979.  As  the  table  illustrates, 
by  the  end  of’  1979  STIPs  in  the  aggregate  held 
significant  proportions  of  some  types  of  money  mar- 
ket  instruments..  In  particular,  STIPs  held  36.5 
percent  of  total  commercial  paper  outstanding,  11.2 
percent  of  total  bankers  acceptances  outstanding,  and 
8.4  percent  of  total  CDs  (i.e.,  all  large  time  deposits 
greater  than  $100,000). 
Tables  II  and  III  confirm  that  STIPs  have  be- 
come  a  significant  intermediary  in  the  financial  sys- 
tem.  The  reasons  for  this  development  are  discussed 
in  the  following  section. 
II. 
FACTORS  CONTRIBUTING  TO  THE 
GROWTH  OF STIPS 
This  section  explores  the  reasons  underlying  the 
emergence  of  STIPs  in  the  late  1960’s  and  their  sub- 
sequent  rapid  growth.  Most  public  discussion  of 
STIPs  has  focused  on  MMFs,  explaining  their  rapid 
growth  as  a  reaction  to  the  impact  of  Regulation  Q 
deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  at  commercial  banks  and 
thrift  institutions.  Specifically,  this  explanation  for 
MMF  growth  is  that  when  market  rates  have  risen 
above  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates,  depositors  without 
sufficient  funds  to  meet  the  minimum  purchase  re- 
quirements  necessary  to  invest  directly  in  the  money 
market  have  turned  to  MMFs  as  a  means  of  getting 
a  market  yield  on  their  funds.  According  to  this 







Money  Market  Funds 
Assets  Number 
($  mil.)  (funds) 
1,715  15 
3,696  36 
3686  48 
3,080  50 
10,858  61 
45,214  76 
Investment  data  gathered 
company  by  authors 
Institute  from  funds 
Table  II 
ASSETS  AND  NUMBERS  OF  VARIOUS  FORMS  OF  STlPs 
(end-of-year) 
Short-Term 
Tax-Exempt  Funds 
Short-Term  Local  Government  Short-Term 
Investment  Funds1  Investment  Pools  Credit  Union  Pools  Investment  Trusts  Total  Assets 
Assets  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  Number 
($  mil.)  (funds)  ($  mil.)  (funds)  ($  mil.)  (states)  ($  mil.)  (pools)  ($  mil.)  (sponsors)  ($  mil.) 
2,660  73  394  4  1,224  1  846  1  6,839 
3,906  102  090  4  1;947  1  0  10,519 
3,427  92  2,034  6  1,816  2  0  10,963 
2  1  8,409  136  3,044  10  1,151  2  0  16,494 
30  1  25,125  na  3,845  11  1,074  2  665  1  41,597 
350  3  32,277  2512  4,779  11  1,237  2  4,614  2  88,471 
Common  Trust  Fund 
Surveys;  ABA 
Collective  Investment 
Funds  Survey  Report 
(1978) 
data  gathered  by 
authors  from  funds 
data  gathered  by 
authors  from  funds 
prospectuses 
1 The  STIF  data  for  1978  is  year-end  data  from  a  special  American  Bankers  Association,  Collective  Investment  Funds  Survey  Report. 
Fund  Survey.  Prior to  1979,  the  Survey  was  conducted  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 
The  STIF  data  for  1974-77  is  from  the  Common  Trust 
number  of  large  trust  departments  not  reporting  in  those  years. 
Banks  that  were  not  national  banks  reported  on  a  voluntary  basis  and  there appear  to  be  a 
estimates  which  are  on  the  low  side. 
In  addition,  assets  were  reported  prior  to  year-end  by  some  banks.  Hence,  the  1974-77  data  should  be  regarded  as 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  the  Federal 
In  1979 the  Common  Trust  Fund  Survey  was  incorporated  into  the  Trust  Assets  of  Insured  Commercial  Banks  survey  conducted  jointly  by  the 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  The  1979  data  is  year-end  and  covers  all  trust  departments. 
2These  251  STlFs  were  operated  by  a  total  of  155  bank  trust  departments  and  5  trust  companies  owned  by  bank  holding  companies. Table  III 
COMPOSITION  OF  STIP  ASSETS  AND  PERCENTAGE  OF  MONEY  MARKET  INSTRUMENTS  HELD  BY  STlPs 
(end  of  1979) 
Money  Market  Funds 
Short-Term 
Tax-Exempt  Funds 
Short-Term 
Investment  Funds1 
Local  Government 
Investment  Pools 
Credit  Union  Pools 
Short-Term 
Investment  Trusts 
Total  Held  by  STlPs 
Amount  Outstanding 
(Dec.  1979) 
Percent  Held  by  STlPs 
U.  S.  Treasury 
Less  Than  1  Year 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
1,621  3.6 
U.  S.  Treasury 
Greater  Than  1 Year 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
-  - 
-  - 
13232  4.1 
96  2.0 
511  41.3 
-  - 
-  - 
65  0.2 
397  8.3 
-  - 
-  - 
3,551  462 
255,252  275,479 
1.4  0.2 
Federal  Agencies  Domestic  CDs 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
4,020  8.9 
-  - 
-  - 
1,262  26.4 
277  22.4 
-  - 
5,559 
n.a. 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
13,053  28.9 
-  - 
3,1953  9.9 
946  19.8 
37  3.0 




Eurodollar  CDs 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
5,076  11.2 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 




Money  Market  Funds 
Short-Term 
Tax-Exempt  Funds 
Short-Term 
Investment  Funds1 
local  Government 
Investment  Pools 
Credit  Union  Pools 
Short-Term 
Investment  Trusts 
Total  Held  by  STlPs 
Amount  Outstanding 
(Dec.  1979) 
Percent  Held  by  STlPs 
Commercial  Paper 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
14,453  32.0 
-  - 
26,112  80.9 
784  16.4 
-  - 
-- 
41,349 
113,282  45,321 
36.5  11.2 
Bankers 
Acceptances 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
4.845  10.7 
-  - 
-  - 
215  4.5 
-  - 
-  - 
5,060 
Tax-Exempt 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
-  - 
Other 
(includes  RPs) 
Amount  Percent 
($  mil.)  of  Assets 
2,146  4.7 
Total 
45,214 
343  97.9 
-  - 
7  2.1  350 
1,582  4.9  32,277 
-  -  1.080  22.6  4,779 
-  -  412  33.3  1,237 
-  - 
343 
4,614  -- 
5,227  88,471 
n.a.  n.a. 
1 Data  on  STIF  asset  composition  was  not  collected  in  the  1979  Common  Trust  Fund  Survey. 
the  1978  Survey  were  applied  to  1979  total  assets  to  get  an  estimate  of  1979  assets. 
Consequently,  the  asset  percentages  from 
2 May  include  some  Federal  agency  issues. 
3May  include  a  small  amount  of  savings  and  small  time  deposits. 
4 Includes  some  CDs  of  domestic  branches  of  foreign  banks. 
5 Includes  all  large  time  deposits  greater  than  $100,000  at  commercial  banks  and  thrift  institutions. 
6  Includes  only  London  Eurodollar  CDs,  which  at  the  end  of  1979  were  almost  all  of  the  Eurodollar  CDs  outstanding. 
Sources:  Sources  for  fund  data  ore  same  as  in  Table  II.  MMF  breakdown  for  domestic  and  Eurodollar  CDs  is  calculated  from  Donoghue’s 
Money  Fund  Report.  Total  outstanding  Treasury  securities,  domestic  CDs,  commercial  paper,  and  bankers  acceptances  are  from  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.  London  Eurodollar  CDs  ore  from  the  Bank  of  England. 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1980 view  “the  entire  money  market  fund  industry  would 
not  exist  without  that  one  regulation  (Regulation 
Q).”11 
In  this  article  MMFs  are  viewed  as  part  of  the 
wider  phenomenon  of  STIPs.  Another  explanation 
for  the  rapid  growth  of  STIPs  stresses  technological 
advances  in  the  computer  and  telecommunications 
industries  that  have  altered  the  production  process, 
improved  the  product  and  lowered  the  operating  costs 
of  STIPs.  According  to  this  view,  “new  technologies 
like  telecommunications  and  data  processing  have 
provided  means  to  give  everyone  equal  access  to  the 
free  money  markets  and  inflation  is  furnishing  the 
incentive  to  go  there.”12 
The  question  of  what  has  caused  the  growth  of 
STIPs  is  not  only  of  interest  in  itself,  but  also  has 
implications  for  the  future  of  the  nation’s  financial 
system.  The  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation 
and  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980  phases  out  inter- 
est  rate  ceilings  on  deposits  over  a  six-year  period. 
If  STIPs  have  thrived  only  because  they  are  a  means 
of  circumventing  those  ceilings,  then  they  would  not 
be  expected  to  survive  as  a  financial  intermediary  in 
the  long  run.13 
The  Demand  for  STIP  Services  In  order  to 
provide  a  framework  for  discussing  the  introduction 
and  growth  of  STIPs,  it  is  useful  to  set  up  a  simple 
model  of  the  demand  for  and  supply  of  STIP  ser- 
vices.  As  a  first  approximation,  investment  in  a 
STIP  is  considered  solely  as  an  alternative  to  direct 
investment  in  the  money  market.  (This  is  a  simplifi- 
cation,  since,  as  will  be  discussed  below,  STIP  shares 
are  also  an  alternative  to  financial  products  offered 
by  other  types  of  financial  intermediaries.)14  Thus, 
11 This  view  was  expressed  by  William  Poole  March  25, 
1980  in  a  statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Do- 
mestic  Monetary  Policy  of  the  Committee  on  Banking, 
Finance  and  Urban  Affairs  of  the  U.  S.  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives,  reprinted  in  the  July/August  1980 issue  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  Economic  Review. 
12 This  statement  was  made  by  Walter  Wriston  in  an 
address  at  the  1980  annual  meeting  of  the  Reserve  City 
Bankers  Association,  reprinted  in  the  April  11,  1980 
edition  of  the  American  Banker.  It  should  be  noted  that 
Wriston  also  cited  Regulation  Q  as  a  factor  contributing 
to  STIP  growth. 
13 This  raises  the  question  of  why  it  matters  whether  a 
new  form  of  financial  intermediary,  such  as  STIPs,  sur- 
vives.  The  third  section  of  this  article  argues  that  STIPs 
have  had  significant  implications  for  the  financial  mar- 
kets. 
14 While  STIPs  do  compete  with  other  financial  inter- 
mediaries,  they  specialize  in  providing  one  type  of,  ser- 
vice  :  short-term  investment  intermediation.  Thus,  in 
terms  of  their  risk  and  expected  return  characteristics, 
STIPs  are  most  clearly  a  substitute  for  direct  investment 
in  the  money  market. 
an  investor  with  a given  quantity  of funds  to  invest  in 
short-term  assets  can  either  manage  his  own  portfolio 
or  place  these  funds  in  a  STIP  which,  in  turn,  will’ 
invest  in  money  market  instruments. 
The  investor’s  decision  to  invest  directly  in  the 
money  market  or  indirectly  through  a  STIP  will 
depend  primarily  on  the  relative  costs  of  each  alter- 
native.  These  costs,  which  will  vary  with  each  in- 
vestor,  are  summarized  in  Table  IV,  where  they  are 
shown  as  the  wedge  between  the  gross  yield  paid  by 
the  ultimate  borrower  of  funds  and  the  net  yield 
received  by  the  direct  or  indirect  investor  in  money 
market  instruments.15 
The  top  line  in  Table  IV  summarizes  the  costs  of 
direct  investment  in  the  money  market.  The  first 
category  consists  of  the  brokerage  costs  of  producing 
a  money  market’  instrument  and  selling  ii  to  the 
initial  investor.  The  broker  in  this  transaction  may  be 
an  independent  agent  or  an  agent  of  the  ultimate 
borrower  or  the  borrower  himself.  In  any  case,  these 
brokerage  costs  drive  a  wedge  between  the  gross 
yield  paid  by  the  borrower  and  the  yield  received  by 
the  investor.  An  important  aspect  of  these  brokerage 
costs  is  that  on  a  per  dollar  basis  they  are  inversely 
related  to  the  size  of  the  debt  instrument.  At  very 
low  levels,  per  dollar  brokerage  costs  are  so  high 
that  debt  units  are  not  produced.  Per  dollar  broker- 
age  costs  fall  with  increasing  unit  levels  and  gradu- 
ally  approach  a  constant. 
The  direct  investor’s  net  yield  is  further  reduced 
by  a  number  of  costs  that  are  specific  to  each  in- 
vestor.  These  “individual-specific”  costs  include  the 
costs  of  managing  the  portfolio  of  money  market 
instruments,  the  costs  of  recordkeeping,  and  what- 
ever  transportation  and  inconvenience  (i.e.,  personal 
time)  costs  are  involved  in  carrying  out  transactions. 
These  individual-specific  costs  of  direct  investment 
are  also  generally  inversely  related  on  a  per  dollar 
basis  to  the  amount  of  funds  the  investor  has  to  in- 
vest  because  of  economies  of  scale  in  portfolio  man- 
agement  and  recordkeeping  activities. 
The  right-hand  side  of  Table  IV  shows  that  the 
final  commodity  held  by  the  direct  investor  is  simply 
a  group  of  one  or  more  money  market  securities 
representing  the  debt  of  one  or  more  borrowers  and 
maturing  on  one  or  more  dates.  Here  again  the 
attractiveness  of  the  end  “product”  is  in  two  im- 
15 The  general  analytical  approach  taken  in  this  section 
follows  Benston  and  Smith  [2]:  “Essentially,  we  view 
the  role  of  the  financial  intermediary  as  creating  special- 
ized  financial  commodities.  These  commodities  are 
created  whenever  an  intermediary  finds  that  it  can  sell 
them  for  prices  which  are  expected  to  cover  all  costs  of 
their  production,  both  direct  costs  and  opportunity  costs.” 
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investment.  The  investor  with  a  larger  amount  of 
capital  can  enjoy  greater  diversification  through  hold- 
ing  the  debt  of  several  issuers.  He  also  has  more 
liquidity  since  with  a  large  number  of  securities  he 
can  schedule  the  rate  of  maturity  of  the  portfolio  at  a 
more  regular  and  steady  pace  to  meet  expected  and 
unexpected  needs.16 
The  second  row  of  Table  IV  summarizes  the  costs 
of  investing  in  money  market  instruments  indirectly 
through  a  STIP.  As  in  the  case  of  direct  investment, 
the  first  costs  are  brokerage  costs.  However,  because 
the  STIP’s  size  enables  it  to  purchase  money  market 
instruments  in  large  units,  these  costs  per  dollar  of 
investment  will  be  lower  than  those  incurred  by  most 
investors  in  the  money  market. 
The  next  costs  associated  with  indirect  investment 
are  the  intermediary’s  operating  and  regulatory  costs. 
Operating  costs  include  account  administration,  sales 
administration,  portfolio  management  and  all  other 
labor  and  capital  costs  of  operating  a  short-term 
intermediary.  Potential  regulatory  costs  include  two 
types.  The  first  are  licensing  and  reporting  expenses. 
The  second  are  those  related  to  government  controls, 
such  as  interest  rate  ceilings  and  reserve  require- 
ments.  (An  example  of  this  type  of  regulation 
affecting  STIPs  is  the  special  deposit  requirement 
imposed  on  MMFs  in  March  1980.)  That  is,  if  the 
yield  passed  on  to  the  ultimate  investor  is  below  what 
would  be  paid  in  the  absence  of  government  controls, 
then  this  difference  can  be  thought  of  as  an  addi- 
tional  “cost”  to  be  absorbed  by  the  investor.17 
The  third  type  of  costs  absorbed  by  the  indirect 
investor  are  individual-specific  costs.  These  costs 
will  be  less  than  or  equal  to  the  individual-specific 
costs  of  direct  investment  in  the  money  market,  pri- 
16 Actually,  the  greater  liquidity  and  diversification  of  a 
larger  portfolio  are  fundamentally  a  result  of  the  high 
brokerage  costs  per  dollar  involved  in  offering  small 
units  of  debt.  If  brokerage  costs  were  zero,  a  small 
portfolio  could  have  liquidity  and  diversification  equal  to 
that  of  a  large  portfolio. 
17 This  statement  assumes  that  the  increased  regulatory 
costs  are  absorbed  by  depositors.  In  certain  cases,  such 
as  binding  interest  rate  ceilings,  the  regulatory  costs 
might  create  excess  profits  which  in  a  competitive  en- 
vironment  could  be  offset  by  other  actions  of  the  inter- 
mediary.  For  instance,  part  of  the  increased  regulatory 
costs  of  binding  interest  rate  ceilings  at  the  deposit  insti- 
tutions  may  have  been  offset  through  such  avenues  as 
gift  premiums,  which  increase  the  true  yield  of  a deposit, 
and  increased  branch  offices,  which  decrease  the  indi- 
vidual-specific  costs  of  using  a  deposit  institution.  How- 
ever,  the  pattern  of  disintermediation  in  periods  when 
market  rates  have  risen  above  Regulation  Q  ceilings, 
such  as  1969, 1973, and  1974, suggests  that  such  responses 
have  not  fully  offset  the  regulatory  costs  imposed  by 
Regulation  Q  on  depositors. 
12  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1980 marily  because  most  expenses  related  to  portfolio 
management  and  recordkeeping  will  be  absorbed  by 
the  STIP.  Other  potential  individual-specific  costs 
associated  with  using  a  STIP-e.g.,  the  search  costs 
in  choosing  a  STIP  and  the  costs  of  communication 
-will  remain.  These  costs  will  be  discussed  below. 
As  shown  on  the  right-hand  side  of  Table  IV,  the 
investor  who  invests  indirectly  in  the  money  market 
through  a  STIP  acquires  a different  financial  com- 
modity  than  the  direct  investor.  This  commodity  is 
essentially  a  one-day  instrument  backed  up  by  a 
diversified  portfolio.18  Here  too,  the  extent  of,  the 
difference  between  the  products  is  a  function  of  the 
size  of  the  investor’s  capital.  The  smaller  the  capital, 
the  greater  the  gain  in  liquidity  and  diversification 
achieved  by  indirect  investment  in  the  money  market 
through  a  STIP. 
In  this  framework  the  decision  to  use  a  STIP 
depends  on  whether  the  costs  of  intermediation  are 
less  than  the  resulting  savings  in  brokerage  and  indi- 
vidual-specific  costs  plus  the  gain  in  diversification 
and  liquidity.  Algebraically,  the  investor  will  use  a 
STIP  instead  of  investing  directly  in  the  money 
market  if 
(1)  OCS+RCS<(BCD-BCS)+(SCD-SCS)+p 
where 
OCS  =  operating  costs  of  STIP 
RCS  =  regulatory  costs  of  STIP 
BC  =  brokerage  costs  of  direct  (D)  or  indirect 
( S )  investment 
SC  =  individual-specific  costs  of  direct  (D)  or 
indirect  (S)  investment 
p  =  value  placed  on  increased  liquidity  and  diver- 
sification  achieved  through  investment  in 
STIP19 
This  relation  will  differ  for  each  investor,  because 
all  items  on  the  right-hand  side-(  1)  the  brokerage 
cost  savings  of  using  a  STIP,  (2)  the  individual- 
18 This  characterization  of  the  STIP  product  applies  only 
to  open-end  STIPs.  These  STIPs,  however,  hold  95 
percent  of  total  STIP  assets. 
19 This  framework  focuses  on  the  difference  in  costs,  and 
hence  expected  net  return,  of  investment  in  a  STIP 
relative  to  direct  investment.  The  potential  increase  in 
diversification  and  liquidity  achieved  through  investment 
in  a  STIP  does  not  fit  easily  into  this  one-dimensional 
framework.  However,  imputing  a  value  to  these  factors 
simplifies  matters  and  provides  a  good  approximation  of 
reality. 
specific  cost  savings  of  using  a  STIP,  and  (3)  the 
value  placed  on  any  additional  diversification  and 
liquidity  of  using  a  STIP-are  inversely  related  to 
the  amount  of  funds  available  for  investment.  Each 
decline  in  OCS+RCS  will  result  in  additional  in- 
vestors  (with  greater  and  greater  amounts  to  invest) 
using  STIPs.  Consequently,  the  demand  for  STIP 
services  with  respect  to  the  “price”  of  intermediation, 
OCS+RCS,  will  be  downward  sloping. 
The  relative  brokerage  costs,  BCD-BCS,  the  rela- 
tive  individual-specific  costs,  SCD-SCS,  and p  are 
all  parameters  of  the  STIP  demand  curve.  Any 
development  that  affects  one  of  these  three  items  will 
shift  the  curve.  For  instance,  if  the  individual-specific 
costs  of using  a  STIP  were  reduced  then  the  demand 
curve  would  shift  to  the  right. 
This  discussion  is  oversimplified  by  treating  the 
demand  for  STIP  services  only  as  a  substitute  for 
direct  investment  in  the  money  market.  In  actuality, 
STIP  shares  are  also  a  substitute,  although  not  a 
perfect  one,  for  financial  products  offered  by  other 
less  specialized  intermediaries  such  as  commercial 
banks.  Consequently,  factors  affecting  the  relative 
attractiveness  of  these  financial  products  to  STIP 
shares  will  also  affect  the  STIP  demand  curve. 
The  Supply  of  STIP  Services  An  individual 
STIP  will  supply  short-term  financial  intermediation 
when  that  service  can  be  sold  at  a  price  that  covers 
the  STIP’s  average  costs.  These  costs  include  both 
operating  costs  and  regulatory  costs.  The  STIP  will 
choose  the  mix  of  labor  and  capital  at  each  level  of 
output  that  minimizes  its  operating  costs.  This  mix 
will  be  a  function  of  relative  prices  and  will  change 
over  time  as  these  relative  prices  change. 
An  earlier  study  by  the  authors  [4]  found  that  the 
long-run  average  cost  curve  for  MMFs  was  down- 
ward  sloping  up  to  a  certain  level  of  assets  (i.e.,  $50 
to  $100  million)  and  then  flattened  out.  There  was 
no  evidence  of  increasing  unit  costs  (i.e.,  decreasing 
returns  to  scale)  within  the  asset  size  range  of  the 
40  MMFs  studied.  Since  other  STIPs  fulfill  the 
same  function  as  MMFs,  they  should  have  similar 
operating  characteristics  and  expenses.20  The  aggre- 
gate  long-run  STIP  supply  curve  is  a  horizontal  line 
20 For  simplicity  this  discussion  assumes  that  all  STIPs 
offer  the  same  product  and  hence  have  the  same  costs. 
As  discussed  in  Section  I.  however.  STIP  features  do 
vary  somewhat.  Furthermore,  for  some  investors  certain 
STIPs  are  not  acceptable  substitutes  for  other  STIPs. 
Nevertheless,  since  the  discussion  here  concerns  the  fac- 
tors  affecting  the  STIP  industry  as  a  whole,  these  prod- 
uct  differences  are  ignored. 
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stabilize  at  a  constant  level.21 
Factors  Potentially  Increasing  STIP  Assets 
Table  V  contains  a  summary  of  developments  that 
might  increase  STIP  assets.  Items  listed  under  (1) 
and  (2)  simply  summarize  the  discussion  up  to  this 
point.  The  third  category  makes  the  additional  point 
that  other  intermediaries-such  as  banks  and  savings 
institutions-offer  financial  commodities  that  are 
close  substitutes  for  STIP  shares,  notably  time  and 
savings  deposits.  If  increased  operating  or  regulatory 
costs  at  the  depository  intermediaries  widen  the 
wedge  between  market  yields  and  the  deposit  yields 
offered  by  these  intermediaries,  the  demand  for  STIP 
services  will  shift  to  the  right. 
While  the  most  common  explanation  for  the 
growth  of  STIPs  is  that  they  are  solely  a  reaction  to 
the  impact  of  Regulation  Q  on  other  financial  inter- 
mediaries,  Table  V  shows  that  numerous  other  fac- 
tors  could  have  contributed  to  this  growth.  Several 
developments  in  the  past  decade  lend  support  to  the 
view  that  some  of  these  other  factors  have  been  sig- 
nificant.  The  rest  of  this  section  discusses  the  expla- 
nations  for  STIP  growth  in  the  context  of  the  frame- 
work  developed  above. 
The  Effect  of  Deposit  Interest  Rate  Ceilings  on 
the  STIP  Demand  Curve  In  several  periods, 
beginning  in  the  1960’s,  short-term  interest  rates 
have  risen  well  above  Regulation  Q  deposit  interest 
rate  ceilings  at  the  deposit  institutions.  During  these 
periods,  the  spread  between  market  rates  and  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceiling  rates  has  increased  the  regulatory 
costs  borne  by  those  investors  with  insufficient  funds 
to  invest  directly  in  the  money  market  (i.e.,  to  dis- 
intermediate).  The  argument  that  STIPs  are  a 
result  of  Regulation  Q  is  that  the  increased  regula- 
tory  costs  at  the  deposit  institutions  have  created  the 
opportunity  for  STIPs,  which  are  not  subject  to 
Regulation  Q,  to  provide  short-term  intermediation 
services  to  investors  at! a  lower  cost  (or  price)  than 
the  deposit  institutions. 
In  terms  of  the  simple  model  developed  above, 
when  market  rates  rise  above  deposit  interest  rate 
ceilings,  the  increased  regulatory  costs  of  investment 
21 The  horizontal  long-run  supply  curve  follows  from  the 
assumption  that  after  a  certain  asset  level  is  reached, 
average  unit  costs  of  the  firm  are  constant  as  output 
increases.  Some  smaller  MMFs  with  costs  above  the 
industry  expense  ratio  nevertheless  supply  MMF  services. 
They  waive  some  of  their  expenses  in  order  to  be  com- 
petitive  with  larger  MMFs,  with  the  goal  of  growing  to 
an  asset  level  where  costs  can  be  fully  passed  on  to 
shareholders.  See  Cook  and  Duffield  [4]. 
Table  V 
POTENTIAL  FACTORS  INCREASING 
QUANTITY  OF  STIP  ASSETS 
(1)  Factors  Causing  the  STIP  Supply  Curve  to  Fall 
THE 
(a)  a  fall  in  the  cost  of  inputs  used  in  STIP  operations 
(b)  Q  fall  in  the  regulatory  costs  imposed  on  STlPs 
(2)  STIP-Related  Factors  Causing  a  Rightward  Shift  in  the  STIP 
Demand  Curve 
(a)  a  decrease  in  individual-specific  costs  associated  with 
investing  in  a  STIP 
(b)  an  increase  in  the  value  placed  on  liquidity  and/or 
diversification 
(c)  Q  fall  in  the  brokerage  costs  of  large  versus  small  debt 
units,  causing  a  decline  in  STIP  brokerage  costs  relative 
to  the  brokerage  costs  of  direct  investment 
(3)  Factors  Related  to  Other  Financial  Intermediaries  Causing  a 
Rightward  Shift  in  the  STIP  Demand  Curve 
(a)  an  increase  in  the  operating  or  regulatory  costs  of  other 
financial  intermediaries 
(b)  an  increase  in  the  individual-specific  costs  of  using  other 
financial  intermediaries 
in  a  deposit  institution  cause  a  rightward  shift  in  the 
STIP  demand  curve  and  an  increase  in  the  quantity 
of  STIP  assets.  The  extreme  form  of  this  view  of 
STIP  growth  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  In  this  case 
when  deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  are  not  binding, 
the  demand  curve  for  STIP  services  does  not  even 
intersect  the  supply  curve  (i.e.,  STIPs  can  not  sell 
their  services  as  a  short-term  intermediary  at  a  price 
that  covers  their  costs).  Only  when  money  market 
rates  rise  above  the  deposit  rate  ceilings  does  the 
demand  curve.  for  STIP  services  shift  far  enough  to 
intersect  the  supply  curve.  An  implication  of  this 
view  is  that  when  market  rates  fall  below  the  deposit 
rate  ceilings,  funds  flow  back  into  the  deposit  institu- 
tions  and  STIPs  are  no  longer  an  economically  viable 
intermediary. 
The  pattern  of  STIP  growth  supports  the  view 
that  binding  Regulation  Q  ceilings  have  been  an  im- 
portant  determinant  of  STIP  growth.  As  shown  in 
Table  I,  STIPs  grew  at  a rapid  pace  in  1974-75  when 
market  rates  rose  well  above  Regulation  Q  deposit 
ceiling  rates.  Similarly,  in  the  1978-80  period  of  very 
high  differentials  between  money  market  rates  and 
deposit  ceiling  rates,  STIPs  again  grew  at  a  rapid 
pace. 
While  Regulation  Q  interest  rate  ceilings  have  un- 
doubtedly  contributed  to  the  growth  of  STIPs,  there 
are  several  possible  criticisms  of  the  view  that  Regu- 
lation  Q  alone  has  been  responsible  for  STIPs.  First, 
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not  totally  compatible  with  the  Regulation  Q  expla- 
nation.  No  MMFs  emerged  in  the  1969-70  period 
despite  very  large  spreads  between,  money  market 
rates  and  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates.  Furthermore, 
when  money  market  rates  dropped  below  deposit 
ceiling  rates  in  1976  and  1977,  STIP  assets  were  in 
general  stable  while  the  number  of  some  types  of 
STIPs  in  operation  actually  increased.  In  addition, 
the  Regulation  Q  explanation  offers  no  insight  into 
why  some  types  of  STIPs,  such  as  at  least  one  STIF 
and  one  credit  union  pool,  were  in  operation  years 
prior  to  the  first  MMFs. 
A  second,  and  more  important,  criticism  of  the 
view  that  Regulation  Q  alone  has  been  responsible 
for  STIP  growth  is  that  it  ignores  other  possible 
factors  listed  in  Table  V  that  could  have  influenced 
the  equilibrium  level  of  STIP  assets.  A  related 
criticism  of  the  Regulation  Q  argument  is  that  it 
assumes  STIPs  are  solely  a  substitute  for  deposits. 
In  fact,  STIPs  specialize  in  the  intermediation  of 
short-term  funds.  As  shown  above,  investors  with 
sufficient  funds  to  invest  directly  in  the  money  market 
will  nevertheless  invest  indirectly  through  a  STIP  if 
the  costs  of  intermediation,  adjusted  for  the  gain  in 
liquidity  and  diversification,  are  less  than  the  result- 
ing  savings  in  brokerage  and  individual-specific  costs. 
Figure  1 
THE  EFFECT  OF  INTEREST  RATE  CEILINGS 
AT  THE  DEPOSIT  INSTITUTIONS  ON 
THE  DEMAND  FOR  STIP  SHARES 
Many  STIP  investors  have  sufficient  funds  to  invest 
directly  in  the  money  market  and  are  using  STIPs 
as  an  alternative  to  direct  investment,  not  simply  as  a 
substitute  for  deposits.22  These  investors  include 
corporations,  local  governments,  pension  funds,  and 
other  institutional  investors.  They  also  include  indi- 
viduals  with  relatively  large  sums  to  invest,  espe- 
cially  some  customers  of  brokerage  firms  who  find 
MMFs  a  convenient  place  for  funds  pending  direct 
investment  in  other  financial  instruments. 
A  final  criticism  of  the  position  that  Regulation  Q 
alone  is  responsible  for  STIPs  is  that  it  can  not 
explain  the  emergence  of  some  types  of  STIPs,  such 
as  STEFs  and  STITs,  that  are  not  close  substitutes 
for  bank  deposits.  STEFs  provide  tax-free  income, 
which  deposit  institutions  cannot  do.  And  STITs 
provide  access  to  the  Eurodollar  CD  market.  Euro- 
dollar  CD  rates  are  generally  higher  than  domestic 
CD  rates  and  the  spread  between  Eurodollar  and 
domestic  CD  rates  has  typically  risen  in  high  interest 
rate  periods.  In  such  periods  STITs  provide  in- 
direct  investment  in  Eurodollar  CDs. 
Effects  of  Technology  on  STIP  Operations  and 
on  the  STIP  Supply  Curve  The  position  that 
Regulation  Q  alone  is  responsible  for  STIP  growth 
fails  to  consider  technological  developments  over  the 
last  several  years  that  have  significantly  lowered  the 
operating  costs  of  short-term  financial  intermediaries. 
As  they  are  presently  operated,  STIPs  are  ex- 
tremely  capital  intensive  intermediaries  for  which 
computers  and  sophisticated  telecommunications  sys- 
tems  play  a  pervasive  role. 23  Computers  are  essential 
to  the  STIP  accounting  system.  Given  the  large 
number  of  securities  held  in  the  STIP  portfolio  and 
the  rapid  portfolio  turnover  of  STIPs,  the  daily 
valuation  of  the  portfolio  and  the  calculation  of  the 
daily  dividend  would  be  extremely  difficult  without 
computers.  An  even  more  important  function  of 
computers  is  the  administration  of  shareholder  ac- 
counts.  Computers  handle  such  diverse  functions  as 
the  crediting  of  daily  dividends  to  each  account,  the 
writing  and  mailing  of  monthly  dividend  checks  and 
account  statements,  and  the  recording  of  every  trans- 
action.  Some  bank  trust  departments  even  employ 
automated  accounting  systems  which  provide  for 
22 Evidence  that  for  many  investors  MMF  shares  are  not 
merely  a  substitute  for  deposits  is  given  in  Cook  and 
Duffield  [5]. 
23 This  assertion  and  the  following  discussion  are  based 
on  conversations  with  STIP  officials,  and  examination  of 
STIP  computer  software  descriptions  and  other  literature 
put  out  by  various  types  of  STIPs.  See,  for  example, 
the  ABA’s  Trust  Software  Buyer’s  Guide  [l]. 
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small  minimum  amount)  from  eligible  accounts  to 
the  STIF.  Some  STIPs,  such  as  MMFs,  STEFs, 
and  STITs,  also  use  computers  as  an  important  tool 
in  sales  administration.  Newspaper  advertisements 
are  monitored  for  sales  and  cost  effectiveness  with 
the  aid  of  computers.  Computers  also  print,  and  mail 
letters  to  prospective  shareholders,  often  in  a  se- 
quence  timed  by  the  computer. 
STIP  expenses  for  labor  to  manage  portfolios  are 
also  quite  low,  because  most  STIPs  confine  their 
assets  to  prime,  low-risk  money  market  instruments. 
As  a  result,  STIP  portfolio  management  is  generally 
guided  more  by  rules  defining  the  type  of  instrument 
eligible  for  purchase  than  by  labor  intensive  study  of 
issuers  whose  debt  is  being  purchased.  For  instance, 
the  majority  of  MMFs  restrict  their  purchases  of 
commercial  paper  to  the  highest  quality  category, 
rated  A-l  by  Standard  & Poor’s  or  P-l  by  Moody’s, 
and  most  of  the  remainder  restrict  their  purchases 
to  the  two  highest  quality  categories,  rated  A-l  or 
A-Z  by  Standard  & Poor’s  or  P-l  or  P-Z  by  Moody’s. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  use  of  computers 
by  financial  organizations  that  operate  STIPs,  such 
as  mutual  fund  groups  and  bank  trust  departments, 
has  increased  greatly  over  the  last  ten  to  fifteen  years. 
In  December  1969,  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission  surveyed  41  mutual  fund  groups  on  the 
extent  to  which  they  used  computers  for  different 
functions.  The  results,  shown  in  Table  VI,  indicate 
that,  for  each  of  the  four  functions  shown,  only  about 
half  of the  mutual  fund  groups  were  using  computers. 
If  the  same  survey  were  taken  today,  the  results 
would  show  the  use  of  computers  by  virtually  100 
percent  in  each  case. 
The  increase  in  the  use  of  computers  since  1969 
(and  earlier)  resulted  from  the  sharp  declines  in 
computer  costs  that  occurred  over  that  period.  Com- 
puters  perform  three  major  services  for  STIPs  :  they 
(1)  make  calculations,  (2)  store  data,  and  (3)  print 
information.  The  unit  cost  of  each  basic  service  has 
fallen  sharply.  The  decline  in  costs  is  shown  in 
Table,  VII  for  two  of  the  three  services.24 
A  second  and  related  technological  development 
affecting  the  cost  of  STIP  operations  was  the  de- 
velopment  of  sophisticated  telecommunications  sys- 
tems  such  as  Inward  Wide  Area  Telecommunications 
Service  (“800”  numbers)  and  computerized  switch- 
boards.  This  technology  was  important  because  the 
vast  majority  of  investors  in  STIPs  do  business  over 
the  phone,  mostly  by  long  distance.  Long  distance 
calls  are  the  rule  because  STIPs  have  to  pool  large 
amounts  of  funds  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  and 
this  necessarily  makes  them  an  “out-of-town”  finan- 
cial  intermediary  for  most  investors. 
By  lowering  the  costs  of  communication  with  cus- 
tomers,  technological  developments  in  the  telecom- 
munications  industry  have  lowered  the  operating 
costs  of  STIPs  and  enabled  them  to  provide  short- 
term  financial  intermediation  at  a  lower  price.  Of 
particular  importance  is  the  Inward  Wide  Area  Tele- 
communications  Service,  which  was  initially  made 
available  in  the  late  1960’s.  Since  1970  the  cost  of 
the  Inward  WATS  has  fallen  significantly.25 
24 The  authors  were  unable  to  locate  time  series  data  for 
the  cost  of  a  line  of  printed  output.  However,  discussion 
with  people  in  the  computer  industry  indicates  that  the 
cost  of  this  service  also  dropped  sharply. 
25 In  nominal  terms  the  cost  in  Virginia  of  a  full  period 
zone  5  Inward  WATS  service  dropped  from  $2,225  per 
month  in  1970 to  $1,675  per  month  in  1980. 
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Percentage  that  Employed  Computers  for  Tasks  Specified 
Account  Trading  Sales  General 
Administration  Administration  Administration  Administration 
63  52  52 
43  29  36  43 
59 
56  56  44  44  46  46  54  54 
Note:  Large  fund  groups  are  those  with  $100  million  or  more  in  assets. 
Source:  Institutional  Investor  Study  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission. 
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THE  DECLINE  OF  COMPUTER  COSTS 
Monthly  Rental 
Cost  Per  Million 
Bytes  of  Main 
Memory 
1957  $105,608 
1964  28,800 
1976  3,800 
1979  430 
Monthly  Rental. 
Cost  Per  Million 
Bytes  of  Direct 
Access  Storage 
1956  $153.00 
1964  75.00 
1970  8.30 
1973  4.85 
1979  1.35 
Cost  of  Data 
Processing 
(cost  per  100,000 
calculations) 
1958  $  .26 
1964  .12 
1972  .02 
1979  .01 
source:  IBM  Data  Processing  Division. 
Additional  evidence  of  the  impact  of  technological 
progress  in  the  computer  and  telecommunications 
industries  on  STIP  costs  ‘comes  from  a  comparison 
of  the  share  turnover  rates  and  costs  of  STIPs  to 
those  of  intermediaries  for  long-term  financial  assets. 
Table  VIII  shows  the  share  turnover  rates  (i.e., 
annual  redemptions  divided  by  average  assets)  of 
MMFs,  which  are  operated  by  mutual  fund  groups, 
and  STIFs,  which  are  operated  by  bank  trust  de- 
partments,  and  the  share  turnover  rates  of  long-term 
bond  funds  operated  by  the  same  sectors.  The  table 
illustrates  that  the  account  turnover  activity  at  STIPs 
is  roughly  15  times  greater  than  that  of  intermedi- 
aries  for  long-term  financial  instruments. 
Clearly,  this  difference  in  turnover  activity  results 
in  a far  greater  amount  of  administrative  and  record- 
keeping  activity  for  MMFs  than  for  bond  funds. 
Nevertheless,  as  was  shown  in  Table  I,  the  weighted 
average  expense  ratio  for  MMFs  in  1979  was  only  55 
Table  VIII 
ANNUAL  SHARE  TURNOVER  RATES  OF 
STlPs  AND  BOND  FUNDS 
(1979) 
Mutual Fund  Bank Trust 
Groups  Departments 
Bond Funds  0.19  0.15 
STIPs  2.84  2.77 
Note:  Share  turnover  rates  ore  calculated  as  annual  redemptions 
over  average  assets. 
Source:  Mutual  fund  data  are  from  the  Investment  Company  In- 
stitute’s  “Trends  in  Mutual  Fund  Activity.”  Bank  trust  depart- 
ment  estimates  ore  the  average  of  the  share  turnover  rates 
of  collective  investment  funds  of  12  bank  trust  departments 
reported  in  their  annual  reports. 
were  collected  by  the  authors.) 
(No  other  annual  reports 
basis  points.  This  is  comparable  to  the  expense  ratio 
of  no  load  mutual bond  funds.26  It  is  inconceivable 
that  the  MMF  expense  ratio  would  be  so  low  if  the 
heavy  recordkeeping  and  administrative  functions  of 
MMFs  were  performed  manually  instead  of  by  com- 
puter. 
To  the  extent  that’  technological  progress  has 
altered  the  production  process  and  reduced  the  costs 
of  STIPs,  the  STIP  supply  curve  has  shifted  down- 
ward.  As  shown  in  Figure  2,  this  has  lowered  the 
STIP  expense  ratio,  and-  increased  the  quantity  of 
STIP  assets.27 
Effect  of  Technology  on  the  Demand  for  STIP 
Services  It  can  also  be  argued  that  technological 
factors  have  increased  the demand  for  STIP  services 
26 This  statement  is  based  on  a  survey  of  18  no-load 
corporate  bond  funds  and  no-load  tax-exempt  bond  funds 
in  Weisenberger  [12].  The  average  expense  ratio  of 
these  no-load  bond  funds  in  1978  was  78  basis  points. 
This  expense  ratio  is  not  directly  comparable  to  the 
MMF  expense  ratio  because  (1)  bond  funds  probably 
spend  more  resources  on  portfolio  management  and  (2) 
the  average  size  of  bond  funds  is  much  smaller  than  that 
of  MMFs.  Both  of  these  factors  bias  the  expense  ratio 
comparison  in  favor  of  MMFs. 
27 Dunham  [7]  stresses  the  contribution  of  MMFs  to  the 
goals  of  multiproduct  firms,  such  as  mutual  fund  groups, 
as  an  additional  factor  increasing  the  supply  of  MMFs 
beginning  in  1974. 
Figure  2 
THE  IMPACT  OF  DECLINING  COMPUTER 
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STIP.  The  most  important  development  in  this 
regard  is  the  widespread  availability  among  most 
types  of  STIPs-especially  MMFs  and  STEFs-of 
the  toll-free  800  number.  As  noted  above,  because 
STIPs  are  generally  out-of-town  intermediaries,  vir- 
tually  all  business  is conducted  over  the  phone,  mostly 
over  long  distance.  With  the  availability  of  800 
numbers,  investors  can  get  information  about  a 
STIP,  inquire  about  yields,  or  purchase  or  redeem 
shares  by  simply  picking  up  the  phone.  There  are  no 
financial  costs,  and  other  individual-specific  costs 
would  appear  to  be  negligible.  With  respect  to  the 
history  of  STIPs,  it  is  important  to  realize  that  the 
use  of 800  numbers  by  mutual  funds  is  a fairly  recent 
phenomenon.  In  1972,  for  example,  only  a  few  small 
mutual  funds  made  800  numbers  available  to  invest- 
ors.  By  1974-75  the  number  had  grown  to  about  a 
dozen.  By  the  spring  of  1980,  however,  almost  all 
money  market  mutual  funds  and  many  other  types  of 
mutual  funds  had  800  numbers.28 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  convenience  of 
obtaining  all  one’s  financial  products  at  one  financial 
intermediary  has  been  thought  to  be  so  significant 
that  savings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual  savings 
banks  have  been  allowed  by  law  to  pay  a  differential 
of at  least  25  basis  points  over  what  banks  can  pay  on 
time  and  savings  deposits.  In  the  framework  of  this 
section,  the  reason  for  this  differential  is  to  offset  the 
marginal  individual-specific  (i.e.,  transportation  and 
inconvenience)  costs  of  inducing  an  investor  to  do 
business  with  a  second  financial  intermediary  (i.e., 
in  addition  to  banks,  where  the  investor  has  his 
checking  account).  For  STIPs  the  toll-free  long 
distance  number  has  made  these  costs  fairly  insignifi- 
cant.  To  the  extent  that  toll-free  long  distance  num- 
bers  have  lowered  the  individual-specific  costs  of  a 
STIP  investment,  the  demand  schedule  for.  STIP 
services  has  shifted  permanently  to  the  right. 
Other  Factors  Affecting  the  Demand  for  STIP 
Services  A  nontechnological  factor  that  also  may 
have  lowered  the  individual-specific  costs  of  invest- 
ment  in  STIPs  is  the  establishment  of  STIPs  by 
intermediaries  that  are  already  providing  other  types 
of  financial  services.  These  include  (1)  brokers, 
which  offer  shares  in  MMFs,  STEFs,  and  STITs, 
(2)  mutual  fund  groups,  which  offer  shares  in 
28 These  statements  are  based  on  a  survey  of  various 
issues  of  the  Mutual  Fund  Directory  published  by  ‘In- 
vestment  Dealers  Digest  and  Donoghue’s  Money  Fund 
Directory  of  Holliston,  Massachusetts.  In  the  spring  of 
1980, 64 of the  78 MMFs  and  STEFs  listed  in  the  Money 
Fund  Directory  had  800 numbers. 
MMFs  and  STEFs,  and  (3)  bank  trust  departments, 
which  provide  MMF  and  STIF  services  to  their 
accounts. 
The  use  of  STIPs  by  brokerage  firms;  mutual  fund 
groups,  and  bank  trust  departments  decreases  the 
individual-specific  costs  of  using  a  STIP  for  some 
investors  by  lowering  the  information  costs  associ- 
ated  with  choosing  a  STIP,  and  by  increasing  the 
convenience  of  using  a  STIP.  This  point  is  signifi- 
cant  because  the  assertion  that  in  the  absence  of 
Regulation  Q,  STIP  money  would  flow  back  into  the 
deposit  institutions  typically  assumes  that  individual- 
specific  factors  such  as  convenience,  information 
costs,  and  transportation  operate  in  favor  of  the  local 
deposit  intermediary.  However,  this  may  not  be  the 
case  for  investors  who  use  STIPs  in  conjunction 
with  other  financial  services  offered by  brokers,  mu- 
tual  fund  groups,  and  bank  trust  departments. 
The  1969-70  Period:  The  Possible  Impact  of 
Blue  Sky  Laws  An  interesting  question  is  why 
MMFs  did  not  start  up  in  1969  and  1970  in  reaction 
to  the  large  spreads  between  money  market  rates 
and  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  prevailing  in  that 
period.  One  possible  explanation  is  the  impact  of 
state  “Blue  Sky  Laws”  regulating  mutual  funds, 
that  for  years  have  set  maximum  mutual  fund  ex- 
pense  ratios.  If  these  maximums  were  below  the 
expense  ratios  needed  for  MMFs  to  cover  their  costs, 
then  MMFs  would  not  form  even  in  reaction  to  very 
large  spreads  between  money  market  rates  and  de- 
posit  ceiling  rates,  such  as  appeared  in  1969-70.  In 
such  a  case  a  downward  movement  in  the  MMF 
supply  curve  would  be  required  to  get  an  expense 
ratio  that  was  both  economically  viable  and  legally 
permissible. 
In  fact  there  is  some  evidence  that  Blue  Sky  Laws 
might  have  been  a  binding  constraint  on  the  ability 
of  MMFs  to  serve  as  a  money  market  intermediary 
at  a  price  that  covered  their  costs.  An  Investment 
Company  Institute  survey  conducted  in  January  1976 
found  that  26  states  had  formal  or  informal  limits  on 
the  expense  ratios  that  could  be  passed  on  to  share- 
owners29  Fourteen  of  these  states  had  limits  of  1½ 
percent  of  assets,  eleven  had  limits  of  2  percent  of 
the  first  $10  million  of  assets,  1½  percent  of the  next 
$20  million  and  1 percent  of the  balance,  and  one  had 
a limit  of  1½  percent  of the  first  $30  million  of  assets 
and  1  percent  of  the  balance.  In  practice,  virtually 
29 In  a  follow-up  Investment  Company  Institute  survey 
in  October  1979, 10 of  these  26 states  had  eliminated  or 
suspended  the  limitations  on  expense  ratios  and  another 
six  states  indicated  that  they  would  grant  waivers. 
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than  the  lowest-expense  ratio  permitted  in  any  state 
in  which  the  MMF  is  doing  business.  Data  on  MMF 
expenses  indicate  that  in  1977-78  several  MMFs  had 
expense  ratios  near  or  at  the  limit  imposed  by  Blue 
Sky  Laws.30  This  suggests  that  in  the  1969-70 
period,  when  the  expense  ratio  necessary  to  cover 
costs  was  almost  certainly  much  higher,  Blue  Sky 
Laws  may  have  prevented  MMFs  from  forming  in 
reaction  to  the  large  spreads  between  money  market 
rates  and  deposit  ceiling  rates  at  that  time.  This 
possibility  is  also  supported  by  the  fact  that  two 
other  types  of  STIPs,  which  are  not  subject  to  Blue 
Sky  Laws,  were  in  operation  in  1968. 
One  possible  set  of  conditions  that  may  have  char- 
acterized  the  1969-70  period  is  shown  in  Figure  3, 
which  assumes  the  same  initial  situation  of  no  inter- 
section  between  supply  and  demand  curves  as  shown 
in  Figure  1.  When  market  rates  rise  above  deposit 
ceiling  rates,  the  MMF  demand  curve  shifts  to  the 
right  and  intersects  the  MMF  supply  curve  at  point 
A.  However,  at  point  A  the  Blue  Sky  Law  expense 
ratio  is below  the  MMF  supply  curve  so  that  MMFs 
can  not  cover  their  costs.  Consequently,  there  is  no 
response  by  potential  MMFs.  ‘If  this  set  of  circum- 
stances  characterized  the  1969-70  period,  it  would  be 
an  interesting  case  of  one  government  regulation 
(Regulation  Q)  creating  an  economic  incentive  for  a 
new  financial  intermediary,  but  another  government 
regulation  (Blue  Sky  Laws)  preventing  that  inter- 
mediary  from  operating. 
Of  course,  it  is  possible  that  MMFs  would  not 
have  started  in  1969-70  even  without  Blue  Sky  Law 
expense  ratio  limits.  The  absence  of  the  800  number, 
which  is  a  development  that  was  much  more  impor- 
tant  to  the  success  of  MMFs  than  to  STIFs  or  credit 
union  pools,  may  have  limited  the  rightward  shift  in 
the  MMF  demand  curve  when  Regulation  Q  became 
binding.  Furthermore,  mutual  funds  may  have  viewed 
the  large  spreads  between  MMF  rates  and  Regula- 
tion  Q  ceiling  rates  as  a  short-run  aberration  which 
did  not  justify  the  costs  of  starting  up  a  MMF. 
Finally,  certain  aspects  of  the  mutual  fund  industry 
itself,  such  as  the  emphasis  on  equities  and  the  near 
total  reliance  on  the  “load”  form  of  distribution,  may 
have  worked  against  the  starting  of  MMFs.  Conse- 
quently,  it  is  impossible  to  positively  attribute  the 
absence  of  MMFs  in  the  1969-70  period  to  the  Blue 
Sky  Laws.  In  any  case,  without  the  decline  in  com- 
30 Expense  data  for  40  MMFs  collected  by  Cook  and 
Duffield  [4]  covering  the  1977-78 period  indicated  that  18 
had  expense  ratios  (before  expense  waivers)  greater  than 
1  percent  and  9  had  expense  ratios.  greater  than  1¼ 
percent. 
Figure  3 
THE  EFFECT  OF  BLUE  SKY  LAWS ON THE 






puter  costs  and  the  increased  use  of  computers  prior 
to  the  mid-1970’s,  Blue  Sky  Laws  would  have  ham- 
pered  the  growth  of  MMFs  in  1974  and  thereafter. 
In  summary,  both  government  regulation  and 
other  factors  have  contributed  to  the  growth  of 
STIPs.  However,  the  position  taken  here  is  that 
even  in  the  absence  of  government  regulations  affect- 
ing  the  deposit  institutions,  developments  over  the 
last  10  to  15 years  would  have  created  the  economic 
incentive  for  a  specialist  in  short-term  financial  inter- 
mediation.  In  particular,  technological  developments 
in  the  computer  and  telecommunications  industries 
have  influenced  both  the  supply  of  and  demand  for 
STIP  services.  On  the  supply  side  technological 
progress  has  altered  the  production  process  and 
lowered  the  operating  costs  of  STIPs.  As  a  result 
many  STIPs  can  operate  at  annual  expense  ratios  as 
low  as  40  to  50  basis  points.  On  the  demand  side, 
800  telephone  service  has  lowered  the  individual- 
specific  costs  of  using  a  STIP.  In  addition  the  wide- 
spread  use  of  STIPs  by  financial  service  organiza- 
tions  such  as  mutual  funds,  brokerage  firms,  and 
bank  trust  departments  also has  lowered,  for  many 
investors,  the  individual-specific  costs  associated  with 
a  STIP  investment. 
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FINANCIAL  MARKET  IMPLICATIONS  OF  STIPS 
Before  considering  the  financial  market  implica- 
tions  of  STIPs,  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  three 
short-term  investment  options  available  to  investors 
prior  to  the  emergence  of  STIPs.  First,  they  could 
hold  deposits  in  a  bank  or  other  financial  intermedi- 
ary.  These  deposits  generally  required  little  or  no 
minimum  investment,  but  were  subject  to  Regula- 
tion  Q  interest  rate  ceilings  that  were  frequently 
below  market  interest  rates.  The  second  option 
was  purchase  of  Treasury  bills,  which  has  required  a 
minimum  of  $10,000  since  early  1969.  The  third 
option  was  purchase  of  private  sector  money  market 
instruments,  such  as  CDs,  commercial  paper,  or 
bankers  acceptances.31  These  securities  are  gener- 
ally  only  available  in  minimum  denominations  of 
$100,000,  although  a  few  issuers  will  sell  commer- 
cial  paper  in  amounts  as  small  as  $25,000  and  bankers 
acceptances  less  than  $100,000  are  sometimes  issued. 
In  this  environment  investors  could  be  divided  into 
three  groups  by  the  amount  of  funds  they  had  to 
invest  in  short-term  financial  instruments.  One 
group  with  less  than  $10,000  had  access  only  to  small 
denomination  time  and  savings  deposits.  A  second 
group  with  $10,000  but  less  than  $100,000  had  the 
additional  option  of  purchasing  Treasury  bills.  The 
final  group  with  at  least  $100,000  could  also  invest  in 
private  sector  money  market  instruments. 
The  fundamental  importance  of  STIPs  is  that  they 
have  made  this  distinction  among  investors  largely 
meaningless.  Because  all  forms  of  STIPs  have  mini- 
mum  purchase  requirements  as  low  as  $1,000  and 
sometimes  lower,  all  three  investment  options  are 
effectively  available  to  all  types  of  investors,  regard- 
less  of  the  amount  of  short-term  funds  at  their  dis- 
posal.  This  increased  access  to  the  money  market 
through  STIPs  has  several  implications  for  the  finan- 
cial  markets  which  are  discussed  below. 
The  Impact  of  STIPs  on  the  Administration  of 
Regulation  Q  Interest  Rate  ceilings  Deposit 
rate  ceilings  under  Regulation  Q  originated  with  the 
Banking  Act  of  1933  and  were  initially  applied  only 
31 This  categorization  is  a  slight  oversimplification.  Some 
short-term  Federal  agency  issues  are  also  sold  in  rela- 
tively  small  denominations  and  a  small  number  of,  cor- 
porations  market  commercial  paper  in  small  denomina- 
tions  through  the  mail  to  individuals. 
to  rates  paid  on  commercial  bank  time  and  savings 
deposits.  The  purpose  was  to  prevent  “excessive” 
rate  competition  for  deposits  among  banks  that  might 
encourage  risky  loan  and  investment  policies,  thereby 
leading  to  bank  failures.  The  passage  of  the  Interest 
Adjustment  Act  in  1966  expanded  the  coverage  of 
deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  to  thrift  institutions. 
The  implicit  ‘assumption  underlying  Regulation  Q 
through  the  mid-1970’s  was  that  most  deposit  holders 
were  relatively  small  investors  who  were  locked  into 
deposits  as  the  only  available  short-term  investment 
option.  As  a result,  if market  rates  were  to  rise  above 
fixed  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates,  there  would  not  be  a 
massive  flight  of  funds  out  of  the  deposit  institutions 
into  other  financial  assets.  That  this  reasoning  was 
largely  correct  can  be  seen  by  examining  the  behavior 
of  savings  deposits  at  the  deposit  institutions  in  1973 
and  1974,  when  short-term  market  interest  rates  rose 
to  levels  over  twice  as  high  as  the  Regulation  Q  ceil- 
ing  rate  on  these  deposits.  While  the  growth  of 
savings  deposits  slowed  markedly  during  this  period, 
total  savings  deposits  actually  increased  despite  the 
huge  positive  differential  between  market  rates  and 
Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates. 
The  emergence  of  STIPs,  by  providing  access  to 
money  market  yields  to  virtually  all  investors,  se- 
verely  damaged  the  ability  of  the  deposit  institutions 
to  raise  funds  at  below  market  interest  rates.  As  a 
result,  after  interest  rates  began  to  rise  above  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceiling  rates  in  1977,  regulators  funda- 
mentally  altered  the  application  of  Regulation  Q. 
This  alteration  came  in  June  1978  when  the  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceiling  rate  on  6-month  deposit  certificates 
(“money  market  certificates”)  was  tied  to  the  6- 
month  Treasury  bill  rate.  Subsequently,  Regulation 
Q  ceiling  rates  on  4-year  and  then  2½-year  deposit 
certificates  were  also  tied  to  market  rates  of  compar- 
able  maturity  U.  S.  Government  securities. 
One  suggested  response  to  the  emergence  of 
STIPs  as  a competitor  to  the  deposit  institutions  was 
to  expand  the  coverage  of  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates 
to  MMFs.  That  response  ignores  the  many  other 
forms  of  STIPs  that  are  either  perfect  or  close  sub- 
stitutes  to  MMFs.  If  binding  Regulation  Q  ceiling 
rates  were  placed  on  MMFs,  the  major  effect  would 
probably  simply  be  to  shift  funds  from  MMFs  to 
other  forms  of  STIPs.  For  instance,  for  bank  trust 
departments  STIFs  are  virtually  perfect  substitutes 
for  MMFs.  If  Regulation  Q  were  placed  on  MMFs, 
many  bank  trust  departments  that  now  use  MMFs 
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STITs  are  close  substitutes  for  MMFs.  If  Regula- 
tion  Q  ceilings  were  imposed  on  MMFs,  many  indi- 
viduals  would  undoubtedly  shift  their  funds  out  of 
MMFs  into  STITs.  As  a  result  STITs  would  prob- 
ably  develop  for  additional  types  of  money  market 
instruments,  such  as  commercial  paper. 
The  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and 
Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980  calls  for  a  total  phase- 
out  of  deposit  interest  rate  ceilings  over  a  6-year 
period.  Developments  other  than  the  growth  of 
STIPs,  such  as  changing  regulatory  attitudes,  may 
have  also  played  a  part  in  the  decision  to  end  fixed 
deposit  interest  rate  ceilings.32  However,  the  view 
taken  here  is  that  even  without  these  other  factors, 
STIPs  would  have  led  to  the  termination  of  deposit 
rate  ceilings.  It  is  interesting  to  recall  the  conclusion 
from  Section  II  that  technological  progress  in  the 
computer  and  telecommunications  areas  contributed 
to  the  growth  of  STIPs.  It  follows  from  this  con- 
clusion  that  the  ultimate  demise  of  Regulation  Q 
ceiling  rates  can  be  partly  attributed  to  these  techno- 
logical  developments. 
The  Monetary  Aggregates  Since  the  early 
1970’s,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  used  various  defini- 
tions  of  the  money  supply-the  “monetary  aggre- 
gates”-as  targets  of  monetary  policy.  Specifically, 
it  has  periodically  specified  desired  growth  rates 
of  M-l  and  M-2  as  a  means  of  attempting  to  achieve 
its  macroeconomic  objectives.  In  practice,  these 
target  growth  rates  have  changed  little  over  time. 
Prior  to  a  redefinition  of  the  monetary  aggregates 
in  early  1980,  no  form  of  STIP  shares  was  counted 
as  part  of  the  money  supply.  However,  as  shown  in 
Section  I  of  this  article  and  summarized  in  Table  I, 
the  basic  characteristics  of  STIP  shares  are  very 
similar  to  the  characteristics  of  savings  and  small 
time  deposits  of commercial  banks,  which  have  always 
been  included  in  M-2.  Shares  of  open-end  STIPs, 
such  as  STIFs  and  LGIPs,  are  virtually  identical  in 
liquidity  to  savings  deposits  in  that  both  can  gener- 
ally  be  withdrawn  on  demand.  Shares  of  STITs  are 
as  liquid  as  small  time  deposits  (i.e.,  deposits  less 
than  $100,000)  at  banks  in  that  they  mature  in  six 
months  or  less.  Shares  of  all  forms  of  STIPs  are 
available  to  investors  in  minimum  denominations  as 
low  as  $1,000. 
32 See  Snellings  [11]. 
In  1978  the  Federal  Reserve  concluded  that  num- 
erous  developments  in  the  financial  markets  had 
altered  the  meaning  and  reduced  the  significance  of 
the  monetary  aggregates  as  then  defined.  As  a result, 
the  definitions  of  the  monetary  aggregates  were 
thoroughly  reviewed,  and  in  early  1980  the  aggre- 
gates  were  redefined.33  The  redefinition  attempted 
to  combine  similar  kinds  of  monetary  assets  at  each 
level  of aggregation.  In  particular,  the  new  M-2  was 
defined  to  include  small  time  and  savings  deposits  of 
banks  and  thrift  institutions.  In  addition,  other 
short-term  deposit-like  liabilities  such  as  overnight 
repurchase  agreements  and  money  market  fund 
shares  were  included  in  the  new  M-2. 
STIP  shares  other  than  MMF  shares  were  not 
included  in  the  redefinition  of  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates.  However,  the  information  presented  in  this 
article-i.e.,  the  low  minimum  denomination  and 
short  maturity  of  shares  of  all  kinds  of  STIPs-sug- 
gests  that  shares  of  all  forms  of  STIPs  logically 
belong  in  M-2  under  the  new  definition. 
In  fact,  some  other  STIPs  are  virtually  perfect 
substitutes  for  MMFs.  The  best  example  is  STIFs. 
STIFs  and  MMFs  are  almost  identical  in  function 
and  organization  and  provide  almost  identical  ser- 
vices  and  liquidity  to  the  accounts  of  the  bank  trust 
department.  34  Nevertheless,  under  the  new  definition 
of  the  monetary  aggregates,  the  $12  to  $15  billion  of 
bank  trust  department  funds  invested  in  MMFs  are 
included  in  M-2,  while  the  $32  billion  of trust  depart- 
ment  funds  in  STIFs  are  excluded.  The  same  type 
of  ‘anomaly  arises  when  a  local  government  invests 
money  in  a  MMF  or  in  a  LGIP.  In  the  former  case 
the  funds  are  included  in  M-2,  while  in  the  latter 
case  they  are  not.  Yet  the  government  unit  receives 
the  same  liquidity  in  either  case. 
Because  MMF  assets  at  the  end  of  1979  constituted 
only  about  one-half  of  total  STIP  assets,  the  new 
M-2  excludes  roughly  one-half  of  total  STIP  assets, 
all  of  which  should  logically  be  included.  This  defi- 
nitional  problem  could  worsen  if  the  growth  of  non- 
MMF  STIPs  continues  to  accelerate  as  it  did  in  the 
1978-79  period. 
33 The  proposal  to  redefine  the  monetary  aggregates  and 
the  resulting  redefinition  are  described  in  Simpson  [9, 
10]. 
34 The  similarity  of  the  turnover  rates  for  MMFs  and 
STIFs,  shown  in  Table  VIII,  supports  the  view  that 
these  different  forms  of  STIPs  provide  roughly  the  same 
liquidity  to  their  investors. 
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Spreads  Figure  4  shows  the  spread  between  the 
three-month  prime  CD  rate  and  the  three-month 
Treasury  bill, rate.  The  figure  shows  that  the  spread 
between  the  CD  rate  and  the  bill  rate  has  risen  in 
periods  when  market  interest  rates  have  been  high 
relative  to  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates,  such  as  1969, 
1973,  and  1974. 
To  understand  this  relationship  it  is useful  to  focus 
on  the  three  investor  categories  described  above, 
especially  the  group  with  sufficient  funds  to  buy  bills 
but  not  other  money  market  instruments.  When 
interest  rates  are  above  Regulation  Q  ceilings,  many 
deposit  holders  with  sufficient  funds  withdraw  these 
funds  from  deposit  institutions  (i.e.,  “disintermedi- 
ate”)  to  invest  them  directly  in  higher-yielding 
money  market  instruments.  Prior  to  the  late  1970’s 
the  bulk  of  such  investment  was  directed  towards 
Treasury  bills,  because  of  the  much  larger  minimum 
amounts  of  funds  required  to  purchase  private-sector 
money  market  instruments  such  as  CDs  and  commer- 
cial  paper. 
The  massive  purchases  of  Treasury  bills  by  indi- 
viduals  in  periods  of  disintermediation  has  driven 
down  bill  rates  relative  to  the  rates  on  other  money 
market  instruments.  This  phenomenon  had  its  peak 
effect  in  mid-1974  when  the  spread  between  private 
sector  money  market  rates  and  bill  rates  reached  a 
level  as  high  as  400  basis  points.  The  inability  of 
most  individuals  to  meet  the  minimum  purchase  re- 
quirements  necessary  to  acquire  private-sector  money 
market  instruments  prevented  them  from  reducing 
this  large  differential  by  switching  their  purchases 
from  bills  to  these  instruments.35 
The  rapid  growth  of  STIPs  in  the  late  1970’s 
(along  with  the  introduction  of  floating  Regulation 
Q  ceiling  rates  on  6-month  money  market  certifi- 
cates)  has  fundamentally  changed  this  situation,  be- 
cause  STIPs  have  effectively  broken  down-  the  mini- 
mum  investment  barriers  that  have  prevented  many 
individuals  from  acquiring  money  market  instruments 
other  than  Treasury  bills.  In  periods  of  rising 
spreads  between  private  sector  rates  and  bill  rates, 
the  yields  earned  by  most  STIPs  will  rise  relative  to 
the  yield  on  bills.  In  these  circumstances  households 
35 This  explanation  for  the  spread  between  bill  rates  and 
other  money  market  rates  prior  to  the  late  1970’s  along 
with  data  on  Treasury  bill  purchases  is  given  in  detail  in 
Cook  [3].  The  explanation  rests  critically  on  the  fact 
that  sectors  other  than  households-such  as  commercial 
banks  and  state  and  local  governments  have  been  willing 
to  hold  bills  despite  large  spreads  between  bill  and  other 
money  market  rates.  This  willingness  occurs  because  for 
numerous  reasons  other  money  market  instruments  are 
not  viewed  as  perfect  substitutes  for  bills  by  these  sec- 
tors.  For  instance,  banks  have  used  bills  to  (1)  satisfy 
pledging  requirements  for  state  and  Federal  deposits,  (2) 
satisfy  reserve  requirements  in  some  cases,  (3)  make 
repurchase  agreements  with  businesses  and  state  and 
local  governments,  and  (4)  influence  the  ratio  of  equity 
to  risky  assets,  a ratio  used  by  bank  regulators  to  judge  a 
bank’s  capital  adequacy.  Private  sector  money  market 
instruments,  such  as  commercial  paper,  are  not  perfect 
substitutes  for  bills  for  any  of  these  purposes. 
Figure  4 
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Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
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out  of  bills  into  STIPs.  Furthermore;  most  STIPs 
are  highly  sensitive  to  yield,  spreads.  Consequently, 
the  aggregate  substitution  of  private-sector  money 
market  instruments  for  bills  in  periods  of  rising 
spreads  should  be  greater  than  in  the  past.  As  a 
result  the  presence  of  STIPs  should  prevent  the 
spread  between  bill  rates  and  private  sector  money 
market  rates  from  ever  again  reaching  the  levels  of 
1974.  The  evidence  to  date  provides  some  support 
for  this  view.  As  shown  in  Figure  4,  in  the  1978-79 
period  of  rising  interest  rates  the  spread  between  the 
CD  and  Treasury  bill  rates  rose  only  moderately 
despite  a huge  increase  in  the  spread  between  market 
rates  and  the  passbook  savings  ceiling  rate.36 
IV. 
SUMMARY 
Over  the  last  decade  numerous  types  of  short-term 
investment  pooling  arrangements  have  emerged  in 
the  nation’s  financial  system.  These  pooling  arrange- 
ments  allow  participants  to  invest  a  much  smaller 
amount  of  money  than  would  be  necessary  to  directly 
purchase  the  individual  securities  held  by  the  pool. 
While  the  first  STIPs  were  started  as  early  as  1968, 
rapid  growth  in  STIPs  did  not  occur  until  1974. 
Aggregate  assets  of  STIPs  surged  from  a  small 
amount  at  the  beginning  of  1974  to  $88  billion  by  the 
end  of  1979. 
Both.  government  regulation  and  other  factors, 
especially  technological  developments,  have  contrib- 
uted  to  the  growth  of  STIPs.  A  principal  conclusion 
of this  paper  is that  technological  developments  alone, 
especially  the  sharp  decline  in  computer  costs  and  the 
introduction  and  widespread  availability  of  800  num- 
bers,  would  have  been  sufficient  to  induce  many 
STIPs  to  begin  operating  even  in  the  absence  of 
deposit  ceiling  rates.  If  this  conclusion  is  correct, 
then  STIPs  will  survive  the  end  of  Regulation  Q 
deposit  rate  ceilings. 
Because  STIPs  generally  have  minimum  purchase 
requirements  of  $1,000  or  even  lower,  they  provide 
access  to  the  money  market  to  virtually  all  investors. 
This  increased  access  to  the  money  market  has  had 
several  implications  for  the  financial  markets.  First, 
36 In  March  1980  the  spread  between  the  CD  rate  and 
the  bill  rate  jumped  sharply.  However,  the  rise  in  the 
spread  followed  the  imposition  on  March  15,  1980  of  a 
15  percent  reserve  requirement  on  assets  above  a  base 
level  at  money  market  funds.  The  data  on  noncompeti- 
tive  bids  at  Treasury  bill  auctions  indicates  a  sharp  rise 
in  the  purchase  of  bills  by  individuals  over  the  same 
period. 
by  providing  small  investors  an  alternative  to  de- 
posits,  STIPs  have played  a major  role  in  forcing  the 
termination  of  Regulation  Q  deposit  rate  ceilings. 
Second,  STIPs  have  increased  the  liquidity  associ- 
ated  with  a  given  volume  of  outstanding  money  mar- 
ket  instruments.  As  a  result  the  shares  of  one  type 
of  STIP-MMFs-were  included  in  a  redefinition 
of the  monetary  aggregates  in  1980.  For  consistency, 
the  shares  of  other  types  of  STIPs  should  also  be 
included  in  the  monetary  aggregates.  Third,  the 
presence  of  STIPs  has  increased  the  aggregate  sub- 
stitution  from  Treasury  bills  to  other  money  market 
instruments  in  periods  of  widened  differentials  be- 
tween  private  money  market  rates  and  bill.  rates. 
This  increased  substitution  should  prevent  the  spread 
between  private  money  -market  rates  and  bill  rates 
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